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TOXIC PUBLIC GOODS
Brian L. Frye
“Be careful what you wish for, you may receive it.”1
ABSTRACT
Everybody loves public goods. After all, they are a perpetual utility machine.
Obviously, we want as many of them as possible. But what if the consumption of a
public good actually decreases net social welfare? I refer to this kind of public good
as a "toxic public good." In this essay, I discuss three kinds of potential toxic public
goods: trolling, pornography, and ideology, and I reflect on how we might make the
production of toxic public goods more efficient.
I. THE GOODS AND THE BADS
Everybody loves public goods. The only problem is that we don’t make enough
of them. After all, public goods are perpetual welfare machines, pumping out endless
utility whenever they are used. Unlike scarce goods, consuming a public good
doesn’t reduce the supply, so all may sup to their fill without fear of diminishing the
table for others. Accordingly, we should always encourage the production of public
goods because they increase public welfare at no marginal cost.
But what if consuming a public good causes negative externalities? Presumably,
people choose to consume a public good only if they expect consumption to increase
their own welfare. But what if consuming a public good increases the welfare of the
consumer while decreasing the welfare of someone else? People have every
incentive to consume goods that increase their own welfare, even if doing so
decreases someone else’s. When it comes to public goods, people will just keep on
consuming, so long as they derive some marginal benefit, no matter how much harm
their consumption causes third parties. Consumption of the public good might still
be efficient if the marginal benefit to the consumer exceeds the marginal cost to the
person harmed, but the distributional effects are troubling.
Even worse, what if people think consuming a public good increases their
welfare, but they are mistaken? In theory, people will stop consuming public goods
if and when consumption decreases their welfare. But people are cussed. What if
they don’t? With public goods, there’s a limitless supply, so people can just keep on
consuming, making themselves worse and worse off the more they consume.
Throughout this Essay, public goods that cause negative externalities when
consumed will be referred to as “toxic” public goods because they are public policy
poison. They are still public goods because they are non-rival and non-excludable,
but they are toxic because they impose negative externalities and may even decrease
net welfare. Toxic public goods resemble “public bads,” which also cause negative
externalities. The difference is that public bads cause negative externalities when
they are produced, whereas toxic public goods cause negative externalities when they

1. See W.W. Jacobs, The Monkey’s Paw, HARPER’S MONTHLY MAG., Sept. 1902, at 634-39.
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are consumed. Toxic public goods also resemble “demerit goods,” which harm the
consumer. The difference is that demerit goods usually aren’t public goods and don’t
necessarily cause negative externalities.2
If toxic public goods were merely a theoretical problem, they would be
interesting, but we wouldn’t have to worry about them. However, we may in fact
encounter them all the time but simply not recognize them as toxic public goods.
After all, welfare is a slippery concept. It can be hard to know how consumption of
a good will affect one’s own welfare, and even harder to know how consumption of
that same good will affect someone else’s welfare.
In this Essay, I will briefly discuss three potential toxic public goods: internet
trolling, pornography, and ideology. Each is a public good because it is either
literally or effectively non-rival and non-excludable. And each may be toxic because
consumption may cause negative externalities or reduce the welfare of the consumer.
So, how should we respond to toxic public goods? Regulation is always an
option, but it may not work well, especially because of the peculiar qualities of toxic
public goods. It’s hard to regulate supply because people enjoy producing toxic
public goods. It’s hard to regulate demand because toxic public goods are freely
available to consumers. And it’s hard to regulate in general because toxic public
goods are usually information goods protected by the First Amendment. Even worse,
the market for toxic public goods is usually a gift economy, precluding economic
regulation via Pigovian taxation. What a dilemma!
Thankfully, regulation may still be possible if we focus on incentives that are
salient to the producers and consumers of toxic public goods. After all, a noneconomic market is still a market. If we want to regulate a non-economic market,
we just have to use non-economic incentives. Typically, both producers and
consumers of toxic public goods value social status, albeit in peculiar and slightly
different forms. So, we can effectively “tax” toxic public goods by limiting the
ability of producers and consumers to internalize the social status they value.
Of course, the government cannot constitutionally burden the production and
consumption of the kinds of speech that typically constitute toxic public goods. But
private companies can. And they are. When internet companies regulate speech,
they’re often regulating the production and consumption of toxic public goods. Or
at least, they’re trying. Maybe reflecting on the choices of these internet companies
through the lens of toxic public goods will help us better understand the decisions
they made and offer us more helpful suggestions on how we can regulate the
production and consumption of toxic public goods as a society.
A. What are Goods?
A good is anything that can produce utility when consumed. An apple is a good
because people can eat it. A painting of an apple is a good because people can own
it. And even the idea of an apple is a good because people can think about it.
Most goods are scarce because consuming them decreases the supply. Scarce
goods are “rival” because consumption by one person prevents consumption by a
different person. An apple is a rival good. If one person eats an apple, a different
2. Thanks to Roger Ford for suggesting the analogy to demerit goods.
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person can’t eat the same apple. A painting of an apple is also a rival good. If one
person owns a painting of an apple, a different person can’t own the same painting,
even though lots of people can look at the painting or own a reproduction. But the
idea of an apple is a non-rival good because an unlimited number of people can think
about an apple.
We use property rights to “solve” the problem of scarcity by making goods
excludable. In theory, property rights ensure that goods go to their best use. If I own
an apple, you can’t eat it without my permission. If you value the apple more highly
than I do, you can buy it from me, and we will both benefit. Accordingly, in a world
without transaction costs, the market will automatically distribute all goods in the
most efficient way possible.3
Unfortunately, transaction costs are ubiquitous. While markets are usually the
most efficient way to communicate information about the supply and demand of
goods, they are never perfectly efficient, so market failures are inevitable. 4 Making
matters worse, the unequal distribution of capital precludes the socially optimal
distribution of goods because the best consumer of a good often can’t afford the
market price.
In theory, the government can solve market failures in scarce goods by
redistributing them to the best consumers. But efficient redistribution is hard. After
all, regulation also has transaction costs. The government can’t always identify the
best consumers of a good and doesn’t always know the optimal distribution of
capital.
B. What are Common Goods?
A common good is a scarce good that isn’t excludable. Accordingly,
consumption of a common good decreases the supply, but no one is prevented from
consuming the good. Neoclassical economics predicts market failures in common
goods because people will consume the good until it is depleted rather than reserving
it for its best use, a phenomenon known as the “tragedy of the commons.”
Of course, the tragedy of the commons can be avoided if common goods are
made wholly or partially excludable. One way to solve the tragedy of the commons
is to privatize common goods. Unfortunately, privatization often results in an
inequitable allocation.5 Another way to solve the tragedy of the commons is through
regulation. Either the government can regulate the use of a common good by fiat, or
communities can agree to manage a common good collectively.6 Of course, either
solution is vulnerable to government failures caused by unfair allocation or
inadequate information. For example, when communities manage a common good,
they often form cartels, giving members more rights than non-members.

3. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECONS. 1 (1960).
4. See generally F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
5. See, e.g., LEON ROSSELSON, The World Turned Upside Down, on THAT’S NOT THE WAY IT’S
GOT TO BE (Fuse Records 1975).
6. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990).

2021]

TOXIC PUBLIC GOODS

5

C. What are Public Goods?
A public good is a good that is non-rival and non-excludable. In other words,
the consumption of a public good doesn’t reduce the supply of the good, and no one
can be prevented from consuming the good. Public goods are great because they
generate welfare at no marginal cost. Paradigmatic public goods are information
goods like ideas and expressions. The consumption of information goods does not
affect supply. However, such consumption often does increase demand and,
consequently, value.
Sadly, neoclassical economics predicts market failures in public goods caused
by “free riding,” which is consumption without paying the marginal cost of
production. While consuming a public good doesn’t reduce the supply, public goods
are still costly to produce. However, public goods are non-excludable, so people
consume them without paying the marginal cost of production. This means that
producers can’t recover their costs, let alone generate a profit. Accordingly, rational
economic actors won’t invest in the production of public goods, likely causing a
market failure. Consumers want to consume more public goods, but they don’t want
to pay for them.
The government can solve market failures in public goods by subsidizing their
production. But transaction costs often cause government failures. In particular, the
government often doesn’t know which public goods to subsidize or how much of a
subsidy to provide. Accordingly, the government often indirectly subsidizes public
goods. For example, the government indirectly subsidizes philanthropy by making
certain contributions to charitable organizations tax-deductible.7 And it indirectly
subsidizes the production of ideas and expressions by granting patents and
copyrights, which makes inventions and works of authorship excludable.
Indirect subsidies solve government failures by reducing transaction costs. The
government often doesn’t know which charitable organizations, inventions, or works
of authorship to subsidize. But private parties may have information the government
lacks. By making charitable contributions tax-deductible, the government leverages
private knowledge about which charitable organizations are likely to be effective.
By granting patents and copyrights, the government leverages private knowledge
about which inventions and works of authorship are likely to be valuable.
Of course, indirect subsidies can’t solve all government failures in public goods.
Sometimes, the government fails to provide a subsidy when doing so would be
efficient. Other times, the government provides a subsidy when doing so is
inefficient. Many people think subsidizing charitable organizations is inefficient
because the wrong organizations excessively receive subsidies. And many people
think patents and copyrights are inefficient because they protect too many inventions
and works of authorship, provide too much protection, and last too long.
D. What are Public Bads?
A public bad is the opposite of a public good. Like public goods, public bads
are non-rival and non-excludable. But unlike public goods, public bads decrease

7. Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 162 (2014).
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welfare by imposing negative externalities. The classic example of a public bad is
air pollution because it is non-rival, non-excludable, and imposes negative
externalities on everyone.
Typically, public bads are byproducts of the production of goods. For example,
factories produce goods, which people want to consume, but they also produce
pollution, which people don’t want to consume. The problem is that factories
internalize the benefits of producing goods, but they externalize the harms of
producing pollution. Accordingly, factories will produce goods so long as there is
demand, irrespective of the costs imposed by pollution.
So, public goods and public bads are both vulnerable to market failures, but of
different kinds. Some market failures can cause the undersupply of public goods
because free riding consumers prevent producers from recovering costs or generating
profits. Other market failures can cause the oversupply of public bads because some
producers ignore the negative externalities of production.
Of course, the government can also solve market failures of public bads by
regulating production or by requiring producers to internalize costs. But transaction
costs make implementing solutions difficult. It can be hard to measure the costs
imposed by public bads and offset them against the benefits of the goods they
accompany. And politics can complicate regulation, especially because the
producers of public bads often have considerable political power.
E. What are Demerit Goods?
A demerit good is a good that harms its consumer. Classic examples of demerit
goods include tobacco, alcohol, and other recreational drugs, which are unhealthy to
consume, especially in excess. The problem with demerit goods is that consumers
want them even though they are harmful. Accordingly, demerit goods cause market
failures because consumer demand for demerit goods causes consumers to harm
themselves.
In theory, demerit goods shouldn’t be a problem because rational economic
actors won’t consume goods that are harmful. Unfortunately, people aren’t always
rational economic actors. Occasionally, people engage in activities that decrease
their welfare even though neoclassical economics predicts otherwise.
Of course, the government can solve market failures caused by demerit goods
through regulation, taxation, or prohibition. But this often doesn’t work out as
planned. Regulation of demerit goods increases their costs, and taxation of demerit
goods generates revenue, but neither necessarily reduces demand, and both tend to
encourage evasion. Prohibition isn’t any better because it ironically imposes
additional harm on the very people it is supposed to protect. Once again, transaction
costs are also a problem. For example, the government doesn’t always accurately
identify demerit goods. Sometimes, the government regulates, taxes, or prohibits
goods that don’t actually harm consumers, but instead merely offend the sensibilities
of political majorities. In this case, democratic politics is itself the harmful good.

2021]

TOXIC PUBLIC GOODS

7

F. What are Toxic Goods?
A toxic good is a good that imposes negative externalities when consumed. 8
Toxic goods are similar to demerit goods because their consumption causes harm,
but they are different from demerit goods because they harm different people. The
consumption of a demerit good harms its consumer, while the consumption of a toxic
good harms others. So, guilt is a demerit good because it harms its consumer, but
shaming is a toxic good because it harms someone else. Some goods, such as
cigarettes, are both demerit goods and toxic goods because their consumption harms
both the consumer and others.
Toxic goods, when compared with demerit goods, present a more difficult public
policy problem. At least in theory, consumption of demerit goods is limited by the
internalization of costs; even if consumers overvalue the benefit of consumption,
eventually the internalized costs may cause them to limit or cease consumption. By
contrast, consumers of toxic goods have no incentive to stop consuming because
they—like producers of public bads—internalize the benefits of consumption but
externalize all of the costs.
Of course, the government can regulate, tax, or prohibit the production and
consumption of toxic goods, just as it can with demerit goods, but such actions are
even more difficult. Just as with demerit goods, regulation may have undesirable
consequences, and transaction costs make it difficult to know what to regulate. Even
worse, toxic goods are often non-economic goods, which makes them more difficult
to regulate. And toxic goods are often information goods, which are constitutionally
protected from regulation.
G. What are Toxic Public Goods?
A toxic public good is a public good that imposes negative externalities when
consumed. Toxic public goods are similar to public bads because they are non-rival,
non-excludable goods that impose negative externalities. But they are different
because public bads impose negative externalities when they are produced, while
toxic public goods impose negative externalities when they are consumed. This is
an important distinction because it makes toxic public goods more difficult to
regulate.
Public bads are typically a byproduct of producing goods. They are vulnerable
to market failures because producers can internalize the benefits associated with
producing goods, while externalizing the harms associated with public bads. By
contrast, toxic public goods are both public goods and public bads at the same time.
They are vulnerable to market failures because the consumers of toxic public goods
can internalize the benefits of consumption while externalizing the costs.
In theory, the government could regulate toxic public goods in much the same
way that it regulates public bads—either by forcing consumers to internalize both
the benefits and costs of consumption or by prohibiting their production. But it’s
harder to regulate toxic public goods than public bads. As demerit goods show,
regulating consumers is harder and riskier than regulating producers. It’s difficult to

8. “Toxic goods” is a term I have coined for the purpose of this Essay.
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know which goods are toxic public goods—as opposed to regular public goods—and
it’s hard to regulate consumption without imposing undesirable regulatory costs. It’s
also hard to regulate the production of toxic public goods because producers are
typically altruists that produce toxic public goods in a non-economic market.
Moreover, toxic public goods are typically information goods, which are
constitutionally protected from regulation.
Why should we care about toxic public goods? They have the potential to
impose enormous costs. Unlike demerit goods, the consumption of toxic public
goods isn’t limited by the capacity of their consumers to internalize the harm they
cause. Demerit goods are bad because they cause harm, but the harm they cause is
limited to their consumers. By contrast, consumers of toxic public goods can ignore
the harms caused by consumption because those harms are externalized.
To make matters worse, because the supply of toxic public goods is limitless, so
is the harm they can cause. Unlike demerit goods, which are typically scarce, toxic
public goods are non-rival. Accordingly, consumers of toxic public goods can
consume as much as they like, imposing negative externalities all the while. And
unlike public bads, which are effectively limited in supply by the demand for the
consumer goods they accompany, the supply of toxic public goods is truly unlimited.
No one demands public bads; they are merely an unfortunate consequence of
producing other goods. By contrast, consumers demand toxic public goods and are
merely indifferent to the harms caused by their consumption.
Ironically, all of this would be fine if toxic public goods were vulnerable to free
riding. Normally, we worry about free riding causing market failures in the supply
of public goods. In the case of toxic public goods, market failures in the supply
would be welcome. Why can’t the government limit the supply by simply declining
to solve those market failures?
Unfortunately, many producers of toxic public goods are altruists who are
indifferent to the cost of production. Consequently, they produce toxic public goods
with no expectation of economic return. However, in at least some cases, producers
of toxic public goods may have an interest in non-economic returns in the form of
social status.
What’s more, toxic public goods are difficult or impossible for the government
to regulate because they often consist of information goods, which receive
constitutional protection. Even if the government could accurately identify toxic
public goods, their producers, and their consumers, they would still be difficult or
impossible to regulate. The First Amendment is indiscriminate. Speech is exempt
from government regulation, largely irrespective of its quality or value. 9
The most peculiar and vexing aspect of regulating toxic public goods is that they
both increase and decrease welfare. The very reason toxic public goods are such a
problem is that they benefit their consumers while imposing costs on others. Even
if the production and consumption of toxic public goods could be prohibited, it might
be inefficient if the benefits of consumption exceed the costs imposed on others. In
that case, it would be preferable to make the consumers of toxic public goods
internalize some or all of the costs associated with their consumption in order to

9. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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encourage them to consume more efficiently. Even better, the negative externalities
associated with consuming toxic public goods could be reduced or eliminated.
The internet and social media have only made toxic public goods more of a
problem. In the past, the harm caused by toxic public goods was limited by
distribution costs. It was difficult and expensive to distribute toxic public goods to
consumers, and the negative externalities imposed by the consumption of toxic
public goods were constrained by networks of limited scope. The problem was
apparent but artificially constrained. The internet and social media effectively
reduced the cost of distributing toxic public goods to zero, making it possible to
spread the negative externalities caused by consumption to an inordinate number of
people. As is so often the case, technology has proven to be a boon and a curse—
not because of its nature but because of ours. It gives us access to whatever we want
to consume, whether for good or for ill.
II. A CORNUCOPIA OF TOXIC PUBLIC GOODS
So, toxic public goods are non-rival, non-excludable goods that impose negative
externalities when they are consumed. They are a problem because the supply is
unlimited, and consumers internalize the benefits of consumption while externalizing
the costs. And they are difficult or impossible to regulate because they consist
primarily of information goods created by altruists and distributed in a non-economic
market. Further, the government is largely precluded from regulating toxic public
goods, and technology has made them ubiquitous by eliminating transaction costs on
distribution.
But I should be more specific. What kinds of goods are toxic public goods?
There are so many! In this Essay, I will discuss three examples: internet trolling,
pornography, and ideology. I will then explain why each qualifies as a toxic public
good and reflect on how we might be able to mitigate their potential harms.
Of course, not everyone will agree that internet trolling, pornography, and
ideology are in fact toxic public goods. That’s fine! People will define costs and
benefits differently. But hopefully these examples will help illuminate how toxic
public goods can be identified, and how their harms can be mitigated.
A. Internet Trolling
Trolling is the signature rhetorical form of the 21st Century. It has existed since
time immemorial, but it needed the printing press to germinate, the internet to grow,
and social media to blossom. Many websites consist of nothing but trolling, and
trolling is nearly unavoidable on any website.
While there are as many flavors of trolling as there are trolls, the essence of
trolling involves making insulting, inflammatory, or irrelevant claims in order to
provoke a response.10 Of course, trolling is always in the eye of the beholder. One
person’s troll is another person’s Trollope. But the game remains the same, and the
goal is always to provoke a response.
10. See, e.g., wint (@dril), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2011, 7:20 PM), https://twitter.com/dril/status/
134787490526658561?s=21 [https://perma.cc/4QMW-2UAJ] (“‘im not owned! im not owned!!’, i
continue to insist as i slowly shrink and transform into a corn cob”).
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In any case, trolling is a quintessential public good because it is perfectly nonrival and non-excludable. A troll is a work of authorship. Like every work of
authorship, a troll is non-rival because consumption doesn’t decrease the supply. In
fact, the consumption of a troll usually increases the supply, as its consumers like
and share it. And trolls are non-excludable by design. The author of a troll never
tries to limit its consumption. The whole point of a troll is for it to be consumed by
as many people as possible. Unlike the authors of other forms of literary works,
trolls don’t even expect attribution. In fact, they avoid it, typically relying on
pseudonyms and “burner accounts” to maintain anonymity.
At least from an economic perspective, trolling is a form of altruism. The author
of a troll produces a public good that people want to consume, and they don’t expect
compensation, other than the pleasure they derive from seeing other people consume
and distribute the troll. But the altruism is what makes trolling so dangerous because
it creates a feedback loop. Trolling begets trolling, no compensation necessary.
Unfortunately, trolling isn’t all fun and games. It has costs, often considerable
ones. Of course, trolling is costly for the target of the troll. Even an unsuccessful
troll can be hurtful, and successful trolls can cause considerable harm—both
emotional and financial.11 Sometimes, they even get you elected President.12 While
the consumers of a troll get utility, the target of a troll gets a steaming pile of
disutility.
So, trolling is a toxic public good because it is a non-rival, non-excludable good
that people want to consume, but their consumption imposes costs on other people.
Not only does trolling impose costs on the target of the troll, but it also imposes costs
on people who dislike trolling. Trolling might also impose costs on the consumers
of the troll if it ultimately decreases their welfare. For example, consuming trolls
could make someone callous or unhappy. Trolling could even impose costs on the
authors of trolls if it distracts them from economically productive activity, tarnishes
their characters, or gets them in trouble.
B. Pornography
For better or for worse, pornography is the predominant artistic genre of the 21st
Century. More pornographic works are produced and consumed than works in any
other genre.13 It is a truism that “[t]he internet is for porn.”14 Indeed, the internet is
a veritable cornucopia of pornography of every conceivable—or inconceivable—
variety.

11. See, e.g., Joel Stein, How Trolls Are Ruining the Internet, TIME (Aug. 18, 2016), https://time.com
/4457110/internet-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/RL9K-UXYH].
12. John Cassidy, Donald Trump Will Go Down in History as the Troll-in-Chief, NEW YORKER (June
29, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/donald-trump-will-go-down-in-history-as-the
-troll-in-chief [https://perma.cc/GW2C-Z3G7].
13. People disagree about what percentage of internet use involves pornography, but agree it is
substantial. Even conservative estimates imply that pornography is the most popular genre of internet
video. See, e.g., Katharina Buchholz, How Much of the Internet Consists of Porn?, STATISTA (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.statista.com/chart/16959/share-of-the-internet-that-is-porn/ [https://perma.cc/DK2EGE4A].
14. See ROBERT LOPEZ & JEFF MARX, The Internet is for Porn, in AVENUE Q (2003).
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Under the Copyright Act, pornographic works are just another genre of
audiovisual works, albeit with unusually prurient subject matter. Accordingly,
copyright vests in the author of a pornographic work who can prohibit use of the
work without permission. At least in theory, copyright turns pornographic works
into private property, like any other copyrighted work. However, in practice, the
ubiquity and sheer volume of pornography available to consumers renders copyright
largely irrelevant.15 Sure, the Copyright Act provides that the copyright owner of a
pornographic work has the exclusive right to distribute it, just like any other motion
picture work. But a copyright is only worth as much as consumers are willing to
pay,16 and no one pays for pornography unless they take pleasure in the paying.
In other words, pornography is effectively a public good because people can
consume as much as they want for free. Presumably, people consume pornography
because they like it. The evidence suggests that they like it a lot because they
consume extraordinarily large quantities of it. Pornography is the most common
category of Google search queries, accounting for about twenty percent of all
searches.17 So, it seems that consuming pornography produces utility in its
consumers, or at least they believe it does.
But there are harms associated with pornography.18 The most serious harms are
inflicted on the people who appear in pornographic works. Obviously, child
pornography and non-consensual pornography cause terrible harm. Consenting
adults can also be harmed in the production of a pornographic work, especially if
their consent is coerced, the scope of their consent is exceeded, or they later regret
their appearance in a pornographic work.
But those are not the only potential harms caused by pornography. Some people
argue that the production of pornography reduces net social welfare, and the
consumption of pornography reduces the net welfare of its consumers. 19 Among
other things, people argue that producing pornography debases society and harms
women.20 And they argue that consuming pornography ultimately harms consumers
by debasing their character and making them unhappy.21 At the very least, some
consumers regret or feel shame about consuming pornography, which implies that it
can have hedonic costs.
Of course, the critics may be wrong. Maybe pornography doesn’t actually harm
society or consumers. Maybe people make pornography because consumers like it,

15. See generally Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption:
Streaming and the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1555 (2019).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6); see also Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1979).
17. See MARYAM KAMVAR & SHUMEET BALUJA, A LARGE SCALE STUDY OF WIRELESS SEARCH
BEHAVIOR: GOOGLE MOBILE SEARCH, tbl.1 (2006).
18. A cottage industry of anti-pornography advocacy groups has emerged to highlight those harms.
See, e.g., FIGHT THE NEW DRUG, https://fightthenewdrug.org/ [https://perma.cc/R4GL-CZQC] (last
visited Dec. 28, 2021).
19. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 195-214 (1989).
20. See, e.g., id.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY:
FINAL REPORT 229-349 (1986); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).
21. See FIGHT THE NEW DRUG, supra note 18.
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and people consume pornography because it gives them pleasure. But if the critics
are right, then pornography is clearly a toxic public good.
C. Ideology
Ideas are the paradigmatic public good because they are perfectly non-rival and
non-excludable. Unsurprisingly, liberal democracies tend to encourage the
production and distribution of ideas, and the United States is no exception. In fact,
it encourages ideas to a fault. While copyright protects concrete expressions, it can’t
protect abstract expressions because that would infringe on people’s abilities to
express ideas in their own ways. Similarly, while patents protect specific ideas, they
can’t protect abstract ideas for the same reason. In addition, the First Amendment
prohibits the government from regulating the expression of ideas altogether,
especially political ideas.
Ironically, ideas are also the paradigmatic toxic public good, especially when
they take the form of ideology. An ideology is “a system of ideas and ideals,
especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy.”22
What a delightfully anodyne description of an inexorable force! An idea is a wisp
of a thing, barely worth remarking, until it becomes an ideology, at which point you
ignore it at your peril.
It should be uncontroversial to observe that ideology can have both welfareincreasing and welfare-decreasing effects. For example, liberalism is an ideology.
Some people think liberalism generally has welfare-increasing effects, but others
disagree. Fair enough. Maybe they disagree about the normative goals we ought to
pursue. Maybe they disagree about whether liberalism promotes those goals. In any
case, different strokes for different folks.
Other ideologies are even more controversial. For example, some people think
communism is a bad idea, either because it is normatively wrong or because it tends
to produce bad outcomes. Others feel the same way about capitalism. Everyone’s a
critic, I guess.
Anyway, it seems pretty clear that ideology could decrease net public welfare.
After all, some ideologies don’t value net public welfare, and others even hold that
increasing net public welfare is wrong. After all, ideology is all about conception of
the good, and some people don’t think maximizing net public welfare is particularly
good or interesting. Go figure!
For better or worse, the 21st Century has produced a bumper crop of ideologies
that sure look like toxic public goods. Most recently, the QAnon variety of
Trumpism seems like a prime example.23 It’s certainly a public good. Anyone can
consume their fill, free of charge, and there’s plenty more where it came from. And
it’s plenty toxic. After all, it consists entirely of a congeries of ludicrous claims and
hateful ideas. For example, a core premise of the QAnon ideology is that the United
States government, media, and financial sector, “are controlled by a group of Satan22. Ideology, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/ideology [https://perma.cc/DP5BZ4YD] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
23. See, e.g., David Gilbert et al., What Is QAnon? Everything to Know About the Conspiracy, VICE
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.vice.com/en/article/akvd5b/what-is-qanon [https://perma.cc/48SLF3JW].
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worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation.” 24 And
yet, many people are delighted to consume QAnon ideology. Hell, they clamor for
more of it. Is it a firehose of bullshit? No matter, they want it on full blast.
Oh no. We have spent generations telling ourselves that the market for ideas
values good ideas and that sunlight is the best disinfectant, only to discover that many
people have terrible taste in ideas and sunlight helps bad ideas germinate and grow.
Oops. I guess that is what democracy looks like.
III. DETOXIFYING PUBLIC GOODS
Never fear, all is not lost. We still have public policy tools we can use to address
the problem. After all, if toxic public goods resemble public bads, maybe the policy
tools we use to mitigate public bads can also help us mitigate toxic public goods.
The obvious solution to public bads is regulation. Unfortunately, regulation
often doesn’t work very well. For one thing, it’s hard to regulate public bads
efficiently. And for another, it’s hard to mobilize the political will to regulate public
bads. Everyone knows that the carbon emissions causing climate change are a
paradigmatic public bad, but governments can’t seem to impose meaningful
regulations to limit these emissions.
But there are other ways of mitigating public bads. One of the most popular and
effective ways is Pigovian taxation. Essentially, Pigovian taxation mitigates public
bads by requiring producers to internalize the negative externalities associated with
their actions. Often, producing a good entails producing a bad. For example,
manufacturing means pollution. If producers aren’t responsible for the pollution they
cause, then they’ll ignore it.
Pigovian taxation solves the problem by making producers pay for their
pollution. Ideally, it makes production socially efficient. Producers will create
goods so long as the value of the goods they produce exceeds the cost of the Pigovian
taxes they have to pay for polluting. But when the cost exceeds the benefit, they will
stop producing. Essentially, Pigovian taxation ensures that producers create goods
when doing so increases net social welfare but stop when production no longer
increases net social welfare.
Obviously, Pigovian taxation is relevant to toxic public goods. We want people
to produce public goods when they increase net social welfare, but not when they
decrease net social welfare. If we could force the producers of public goods to
internalize the costs associated with the goods they produce, then we would make
the production of public goods more efficient and “detoxify” toxic public goods.
IV. A GREAT CLEANSE
Not so fast. There’s a problem. Pigovian taxation not only requires government
action, but it also requires the capacity to tax. The government often can’t regulate
toxic public goods because they are protected by the First Amendment. And even if
it could regulate them, it couldn’t tax them because there is nothing to tax. After all,
24. Chuck Todd et al., Study Finds Nearly One-in-Five Americans Believe QAnon Conspiracy
Theories, NBC NEWS (May 27, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/study-finds-ne
arly-one-five-americans-believe-qanon-conspiracy-theories-n1268722 [https://perma.cc/V227-PW2Z].
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no one is selling toxic public goods; they’re available for anyone to consume, free of
charge.
Thankfully, private actors can take the government’s place. Sure, the
government can’t regulate speech protected by the First Amendment, but businesses
can. Typically, people use social media platforms to distribute toxic public goods.
The companies that own those platforms have every right to regulate them. If they
want to prohibit certain kinds of speech, they can. And if they want to regulate
speech, they can do that as well.
Companies that own internet platforms can not only prohibit people from using
their platforms in toxic ways, but they can also tax toxic uses of their platforms. For
example, the owner of an internet platform could prohibit the expression of certain
ideologies or impose penalties for the expression of ideas supportive of those
ideologies.
Of course, they already do. Companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google have
invested a lot of time and energy in thinking about how to regulate speech in order
to maximize its value. That is their business model. Unsurprisingly, they focus on
managing speech rather than controlling it. After all, speech is a public good and
sometimes, it’s a toxic public good. But it’s hard to know when a public good
becomes toxic. Better to rely on the market and regulate on the margins.
V. CONCLUSION
Public goods are wonderful, but toxic public goods are terrible. Reflecting on
why goods become public goods—and why public goods can be toxic public goods—should encourage us to reflect on what we want public policy to achieve. Maybe
the government isn’t the best entity to regulate speech. And maybe private regulation
is fine. Or, at least, it is the best we can do.
We want to believe that the internet can be an ugly place because internet
companies like it that way. But in our hearts, we know the internet can be an ugly
place because we like it that way. Internet companies are just giving us what we
want to consume but don’t want to admit we enjoy. “We have met the enemy and
he is us.”25 If we want to make things better, we should start by admitting
responsibility.

25. Walt Kelly, Pogo (cartoon), in Pogo Collection, BILLY IRELAND CARTOON LIBRARY & MUSEUM,
OHIO STATE UNIV. (Apr. 22, 1971) https://library.osu.edu/site/40stories/2020/01/05/we-have-met-theenemy/ [https://perma.cc/3CC6-ZWLU].

